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What Exactly Are Exactions? 
By Jessica Owley 
 
 
This is going to be an exciting year for takings juris- 
prudence. The Supreme Court has appeared eager to take 
up cases involving Fifth Amendment Takings claims in a 
variety of contexts. One of these cases in particular, Koontz 
v. St. John’s River Water Management District, could have 
signifi cant implications for New York law. 
 
I. Takings Jurisprudence 
Historically, takings jurisprudence involved instances 
where governments encroached on or occupied private 
land without providing just compensation. In 1922, how- 
ever, the Supreme Court recognized that governmental 
regulations that ‘‘go[] too far’’ in restricting property use 
can qualify as a taking even where the government has 
not physically seized the parcel.1 Since the 1922 case of 
Pennsylvania Coal Company v. Mahon, the Supreme Court 
has struggled to articulate when a regulation has ‘‘gone 
too far’’ such that landowners must be compensated for 
the regulation’s deleterious effects. Most acknowledge 
that this has been a tricky and not altogether successful 
endeavor. Where a regulation deprives a parcel of ‘‘all 
economically viable use,’’ courts fi nd little difference be- 
tween regulating and physical occupation of the property, 
declaring the regulation a taking which requires either 
just compensation or an invalidation of the regulation.2 
Generally, courts look to the balancing test estab- 
lished in Penn Central Transportation Company v. City of 
New York3 to determine if there has been a taking. The 
Penn Central factors instruct courts to examine ‘‘the 
regulation’s economic effect on the landowner, the ex- 
tent to which the regulation interferes with reasonable 
investment-back expectations and the character of the 
government action.’’4 Courts depart from this Penn Cen- 
tral balancing test, however, when the regulatory action is 
an exaction. Exactions are a special category of regulatory 
behavior that the Supreme Court has deemed to merit a 
different level of analysis as spelled out in two important 
cases: Nollan v. California Coastal Commission5 and Dolan v. 
City of Tigard.6  
Nollan and Dolan set forth specifi c rules for assess- 
ing when an exaction is impermissible under the Fifth  
Amendment’s prohibition of taking property without just 
compensation. In Nollan, the Supreme Court explained 
that the land-use restriction must be tied to the harm the 
restriction seeks to cure. In the words of the Court, the 
exaction must have an ‘‘essential nexus’’ with the pub- 
lic harm sought to be alleviated.7 In that case, the Court 
found that the government-mandated public access did 
not have an essential nexus with the purported harm of 
obstructed ocean views and a psychological barrier, cre- 
ated by a developed shorefront that prevented beach use.8  
 
Thus, the exaction did not work to cure the harm caused 
by the proposed development project. The Court noted 
that other land-use restrictions, such as height limita- 
tions or width restrictions, might have been valid, as they 
would have been tailored to address the problem of vi- 
sual impediments to the beach.9 
In Dolan, the Court further described the contours  
of permissible exactions by declaring that the exaction 
must be roughly proportional to the harm imposed.10 
Once a government entity meets the Nollan requirement 
and demonstrates that the exaction is linked to the harm  
caused, it also needs to show that the level of the exaction 
does not outstrip the level of harm caused by the project 
in question. The Dolan Court declared that the exaction 
must be ‘‘roughly proportional’’ to the impact of the pro- 
posed activity. Based on this theory, the Court invalidated 
requirements that a landowner dedicate portions of her 
property for storm drainage and a pedestrian and bicycle 
path. The Court found a nexus between the development 
and the exactions because the development would in- 
crease impervious surfaces (affected storm drainage) and 
increase vehicular traffi c. However, the Court concluded 
that the City of Tigard failed to demonstrate that the pro- 
posed construction’s impacts on fl ood control and traffi c 
merited the proposed dedications, requiring ‘‘some sort of 
individualized determination that the required dedication 
is related in both the nature and extent to the impacts of 
the proposed development.’’11 
In the wake of Nollan and Dolan, scholars and courts 
delved into the signifi cant nexus and rough proportionali- 
ty tests in attempts to assess what levels of exaction might 
be permissible. The Court limited the reach of these tests 
in City of Monterrey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 
where it explained that the ‘‘rough proportionality’’ test 
does not apply beyond the unique circumstances of cases 
involving exactions. 
 
II. Exactions in New York 
Faced with these instructions from the Supreme 
Court, New York has grappled with how to apply the Nol- 
lan and Dolan tests, usually limiting the use of these tests 
by defi ning what qualifi es as an exaction. There is some 
variation in the defi nition of exaction, but generally exac- 
tions are requirements placed on a landowner seeking to 
obtain a development permit. At the most basic, we can 
think of exactions as permit conditions, although some 
argue for more limited defi nitions.  
Exactions most commonly take the form of contribu- 
tions of money or dedications of land.12 Exactions enable 
local governments to transfer the costs associated with  
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new development to the developers and future residents 
of the projects.13 Exactions for streets, sidewalks, and 
utilities within a subdivision are common examples.  
The Supreme Court has validated the use of exac- 
tions as an implementation of a zoning authority’s police 
power, as long as the condition substantially furthers gov- 
ernmental purposes that could justify denial of a building 
permit. The federal takings jurisprudence requires an 
assessment of whether the proposed exaction is roughly 
proportional and bears an essential nexus with the expect- 
ed impacts of the project. The discussion hinges on our 
view of property rights. The Fifth Amendment prohibits 
the taking of property without just compensation; how- 
ever, it is sometimes diffi cult to evaluate what constitutes 
property for Fifth Amendment purposes. Some might ar- 
gue that every limitation on a landowner’s freedom of ac- 
tion should be a compensable property right. Thus, a Nol- 
lan/Dolan analysis would be required for laws regarding 
actions as diverse as requiring a landowner to dedicate a 
portion of her land to a public footpath or requiring her to 
paint her house a color that blends in with the landscape. 
While most courts agree turning a portion of private land 
over to the public (or restricting a landowner’s right to 
exclude) qualifi es as an exaction, courts are less comfort- 
able with invalidating a restriction on the ability to paint  
a house hot pink for its infringement on a compensable 
property right. Where should the line be drawn? 
In Smith v. Town of Mendon,14 the New York Court of 
Appeals avoided evaluating a permit condition on Nollan 
and Dolan grounds by fi nding that it was not an exaction. 
In Smith, the court held that what would generally be 
termed an ‘‘exacted conservation easement’’15 was not an 
exaction. It reached this conclusion by limiting the defi ni- 
tion of exaction to requiring a dedication of property for 
public use.   
Paul and Janet Smith owned a 9.7-acre lot in the Town 
of Mendon, located along a protected waterway. Their  
lot was described as including ‘‘several environmentally 
sensitive parcels’’ and falling with the Honeyoe Creek’s 
100-year fl ood plain. In particular, steep slopes on the 
property created concerns for erosion. The Mendon Town 
Code established environmental protection overlay dis- 
tricts (EPODs),16 with four different EPODs that limited 
the Smiths’ use of their property. Landowners can acquire 
development permits for projects within EPODs if they 
can show that their proposed activities will not cause un- 
due harm, for example. by destabilizing soil and causing 
erosion. Permit applicants must make a specifi c showing 
that the proposed activity will not injure the environmen- 
tally sensitive features of the property. 
In December 2001, the Smiths applied to the Town 
Planning Board for site plan approval to construct a 
single-family home in the non-EPOD portion of their 
property. In July 2002, the Board issued a fi nal site plan 
approval, concluding that the Smiths’ proposal was not  
likely to result in any adverse environmental impacts as 
long as there was no development in the EPOD portions 
of the site. The Planning Board also conditioned fi nal site 
plan approval on the Smiths’ fi ling a conservation restric- 
tion on any development within the mapped EPODs and 
amending the fi nal site plan map accordingly. The Board 
characterized these restrictions as putting the EPOD 
requirements into the deed and thereby ‘‘put[ting] sub- 
sequent buyers on notice that the property contains con- 
straints which may limit development.’’17 The proposed 
conservation restrictions closely mapped the limitations 
established by the EPOD regulations and did not require 
the Smiths to open up their property to public access. 
The Town  argued that the conservation restriction 
did not take any property right from the Smiths, because 
it merely repeated already existing regulatory restric- 
tions. The difference, however, was that the conservation 
restrictions would operate in perpetuity, while the Town 
of Mendon could amend its EPOD ordinance at any time. 
Additionally, putting the land-use restrictions in the deed 
gave the Town an additional enforcement mechanism.  
If the Smiths or a subsequent landowner violated the 
terms of the conservation restriction (which again were 
the same as the terms of the EPOD), the Town could seek 
equitable relief in court. Thus, for the same violation, the 
Town could both get injunctive relief based on the deed 
restriction and issue a citation for violating the EPOD. 
If the conservation restriction constitutes an exaction, 
the Fifth Amendment takings analysis would involve ap- 
plication of the Nollan and Dolan inquiries into the essen- 
tial nexus and rough proportionality of the exaction. If the 
restriction is not an exaction, only the Penn Central balanc- 
ing test-----which is generally considered more favorable to 
the regulators-----applies. The court was persuaded by the 
Attorney General’s amicus brief asserting that conserva- 
tion restrictions of this type do not constitute exactions 
because they do not involve the dedication of property to 
public use. The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the 
federal exaction cases and found that they all involved 
dedications of real property that limit the landowner’s 
ability to exclude the public from her property. Where  
the right to exclude is not involved, there is no exaction.  
Thus, although the Smiths were required to place a limita- 
tion on their property rights, this limitation did not rise  
to the level of an exaction, because there was no require- 
ment to allow public access to the site. The Smith court 
narrowly interpreted ‘‘public use’’ to only involve actual 
presence on the land by members of the public. Thus, in 
New York, only possessory rights or affi rmative public 
easements constitute exactions. 
Perhaps because it was already bound by precedent, 
the Smith court also noted that a ‘‘fee imposed in lieu of a 
physical dedication of property to public use’’ also quali- fi 
es as an exaction for the purpose of takings jurispru- 
dence.18 It is unclear how the court reconciled these two 
holdings. The Smith Court explained that the paramount  
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stick in the property rights bundle for assessing whether 
something is an exaction is whether the right to exclude 
others has been taken. This analysis does not support  
the holding that in lieu fees should constitute exactions. 
This creates a strange juxtaposition where New York has  
both a narrower and broader view of exactions than other 
states. For example, in California, requiring a landowner 
to place a conservation easement on her property is con- 
sidered an exaction while requiring her to pay an in lieu 
fee is not.19 In fact, many courts are confl icted on the issue 
of fees but fi nd little debate about conservation easements 
or similar restrictions.  
Smith v. Town of Mendon may need revisiting pending 
the result of Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management 
District. The Supreme Court heard oral argument of the 
case in January20 and an opinion is expected this summer. 
 
III. Supreme Court Revisits Exactions 
Koontz involved a Florida landowner’s claim that he  
is owed just compensation for an exaction that never ac- 
tually occurred.21 Coy Koontz, Sr. owned land in Orange 
County, Florida. He wanted to develop 3.7 acres but was 
restricted by the St. John’s River Water Management Dis- 
trict (‘‘the District’’) that controlled a habitat protection 
zone encompassing those acres. Koontz applied for two 
permits in 1993 and 1994 that would have destroyed 3.4 
acres of wetland and 0.3 acres of protected uplands. In re- 
turn for the permits, Koontz volunteered to place 11 other 
acres of his property into a conservation easement. The 
district deemed the 11 acres to be inadequate mitigation 
and suggested additional mitigation including the option 
of paying for improving wetlands on land owned by the 
district. Koontz refused the deal, and his permit applica- 
tion was denied. 
Koontz (who died in 2000 and has been succeeded in 
this matter by his son Coy Koontz, Jr.) fi led suit, claiming 
the proposed exactions would have been invalid under 
the Fifth Amendment takings jurisprudence. Essentially, 
Koontz asserted that the proposed exaction was excessive 
and would fail Dolan’s requirement of rough proportion- 
ality. 
This case raises major questions about the right of 
government agencies to impose conditions in return for 
permit approval. These conditions (which some might 
term exactions…but not us New Yorkers) can take many 
forms, including ‘‘money, services, labor or any other  type 
of personal property.’’22 Koontz’s circumstance dif- fers 
from that in Nollan, Dolan, and Smith, because the 
landowner was not only being asked to limit action on his 
own property but also provide payments for offsite wet- 
land restoration and rehabilitation. It is not clear whether 
either of these requirements (had they actually been im- 
posed) would constitute exactions in New York because, 
under Smith, conservation easements are not exactions 
unless they involve public access and this one did not.  
Furthermore, it is not clear that these types of payments 
would even be considered exactions in New York. While 
the New York Court of Appeals held payments to be exac- 
tions in Twin Lakes Development Corp. v. Town of Monroe,  
it limited its holding to fees imposed in lieu of a physical 
dedication. Mitigation fees do not appear to meet that  
defi nition.  
The Supreme Court has not yet determined whether 
exactions include fees or partial property rights where 
public access is not involved. However, there is nothing 
in the language of Nollan/Dolan suggesting such a limita- 
tion.  
The Koontz oral argument offers some indications 
as to how the Supreme Court Justices view and defi ne 
exactions. For example, both Justice Kennedy and Chief  
Justice Roberts pushed the attorneys to evaluate whether 
exactions change nature when offsite or onsite, but both 
argued offsite and onsite mitigation should be treated in  
a similar manner. In Koontz’s view, this means viewing 
offsite mitigation as an exaction, while in the District’s 
view, it means subjecting the condition to a Penn Central 
analysis (i.e., not treating it as an exaction). Justice Breyer 
seemed to fi nd the location of the permit condition im- 
portant, pointing out that the District had given Koontz 
several options (beyond the offsite mitigation fees) to 
mitigate the impacts of his proposed development, many 
of which were on his own property. Thus, at least three of 
the justices are interested in where the permit condition 
occurs when determining whether the condition qualifi es 
as an exaction, meriting Nollan/Dolan analysis. 
The District argued in its brief that a takings analysis 
(neither Nollan/Dolan or Penn Central) should not be ap- 
plied when a permitting agency imposes conditions that 
require a developer to spend some money for a public 
project, but the court seemed to have trouble accepting 
that argument. The District argued that by extending the 
takings concept to monetary obligations, there would be 
no logical stopping point. Again, it was not clear that the 
justices agreed. Justice Kagan inquired into whether all 
permit conditions are takings. Koontz argued that any- 
time a permitting authority asks for any property (includ- 
ing money), there is an exaction. Justice Scalia agreed, and 
several other justices appeared to agree, that if the permit- 
ting authority required payments of money, there would 
be an exaction appropriately subject to Nollan/Dolan anal- 
ysis. If the Supreme Court addresses these issues in its 
opinion, and thereby broadens the scope of permit condi- 
tions that it defi nes as exactions (or subjects to exaction- 
like analysis), New York law will be out of step with fed- 
eral requirements. Whether you characterize the move as 
extending the defi nition of exaction or just applying the 
Nollan/Dolan analysis to additional categories of permit 
conditions, New York State will end up with more takings 
cases and a heavier burden on public agencies to justify 
their environmental protection permitting schemes. 
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